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Appellants petition for rehearing in this matter, upon the fol-
lowing grounds: 
DISPOSITION OF INTEREST ON DEPOSITED FUNDS 
The legal principles relied upon by the Court in denying appel-
lants any part of interest accumulated on deposited funds in this 
matter are inapposite. The Court's understanding of the facts perti-
nent to this question is fundamentally incorrect. 
Applicable Law 
The Court has relied upon cases from Florida and California 
(under a specific California statute) which hold that where a purcha 
er of property deposits funds for the purpose, and subsequently with 
draws them because seller wrongfully cannot or will not complete the 
transaction, buyer is entitled to interest accruing on his money whi 
on deposit. See Rasmussen v. Moe, 292 P.2d 226, 230 (Calif. 1956); 
Resnick v. Goldman, 133 So. 2d 770, 771-772 (Fla. 1961). These cas< 
are inapplicable: appellants do not dispute that if respondent wen 
to take back his money and withdraw his complaint, he would be enti 
tied to the interest accumulated on the deposit. The cases relied 
upon by the Court do not hold, or imply, that where the transaction 
completed and the money delivered to the seller, interest on the 
deposit should be awarded to buyer, as has been done in the present 
case. The applicable rule is, in fact, precisely the opposite: ij 
the transaction is enforced, interest on the price presumptively 
belongs to seller. 
The appropriate rule in the present circumstances, for which 
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apposite Utah case law exists, is that where specific performance is 
decreed the parties are to be given the benefits of their bargain as 
of the date it was to be executed. The buyer should have the benefit 
of possession of the land, and the seller should have the benefit of 
possession of the money, from the date of execution. The court is 
required in such case to apportion between buyer and seller the value 
of the money deposited, and the value of the use of the land, from and 
after the date money and land should have been exchanged, based upon 
who actually had use of the money and/or land. Eliason v. Watts, 615 
P.2d 427 (Utah 1980). If, because of a deposit, buyer has not had use 
of his money, and the seller has meanwhile denied buyer use of the 
land, the buyer is entitled to the interest accumulated on the money 
(and perhaps also to additional rental value of the land). On the 
other hand, if the seller has not had use of the money, and has 
provided buyer use of the land, the seller is entitled to the interest 
on the deposited funds. If buyer and seller have shared use of the 
land, some appropriate apportionment of the interest is required. 
Anything else denies the parties the benefit of their bargain. 
Undisputed Facts 
Facts admitted in this case demonstrate that Miller was provided 
full use of the property, with a single exception: appellants have 
given respondent full possession, use and enjoyment of the property 
throughout this matter, and respondent has admittedly utilized them as 
he sees fit, with the single exception that, with respondent's know-
ledge and consent, during one three month season in one year a frac-
tion of the property was rented to a third person for grazing. Appel-
lants, meanwhile, have not set foot on the property, or made any other 
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use of it, and have been prevented by respondent's lis pendens from 
making any disposition of it. It is simply admitted in this case that 
respondent has had all the use and enjoyment of the property he would 
have had if appellants had accepted the money deposited, with a singl< 
small exception. Appellants are prepared to have the proceeds of tha 
exception deducted from interest on their funds, or to pay such pro-
ceeds to respondent. 
(During the pendency of this appeal, the small part of the land 
which can be leased, by agreement of the parties has been leased, anc 
the funds deposited to be delivered to the owner of the property 
according to the outcome of the appeal.) 
Certainly, it is true that respondent's possession, use and 
control of the property before and after the deposit have not change 
respondent maintained a house and employee on the property, kept the 
keys to the gates, had authority to prevent others entering, and mad 
all the use of the property he wished before attempting to acquire t 
property as well as after. Tr., Vol. II, pp. 223, 275, 280, 287-29." 
295, 297, 782. Indeed, respondent testified that it was to preserv< 
and continue the use of the property which he and his family had ma-
that he attempted to purchase it. Id. That fact, however, is imma 
terial. All that is significant is that he was not denied possessi 
use and control after the deposit, and, in fact, his possession, us 
and control continued thereafter. 
Respondent claims - and the District Court found - that the 
actual use of the property made by respondent was "sporadic". Thii 
equally immaterial. The property is a large one having essentiall 
recreational uses: no one would have expected respondent to fully 
occupy the entire property all the time. What is material is that 
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use respondent wished to make was denied. If he had full use and 
possession, and chose to exercise the right only "sporadically", the 
legal affect is quite the same as if he had full use and possession 
and utilized the property constantly. The admitted facts are that 
respondent kept a house and an employee on the premises at all times, 
that he kept the keys to the gates at all times, that he had authority 
at all times to exclude others, that respondent and his family made 
such uses as they wished when they wished, and that no one impeded any 
use of the land they wished to make. 
It is equally immaterial that Respondent did not use the small 
part of the property which can be rented to a local cattle operation. 
The undisputed evidence is that this part of the property was at all 
times offered to Respondent, and that Respondent declined. Only then 
was this part of the property rented to another, and the proceeds held 
to abide the outcome of the appeal. Id. 
It may also be true that third persons gained access to the land 
from time to time and made uses of it similar to respondent's. This 
fact is also immaterial. The property is fenced and posted against 
trespass. It has locked gates on the access roads. Respondent, 
before the attempt to purchase the property, was given authority, and 
requested, to keep others off. The authority and request were not 
revoked when respondent attempted to purchase.. That is, if others 
entered and used the land thereafter, they did so at respondent!s 
leave, not at appellants1. 
Of course, respondent's use of the land was without appellants' 
objection. This is equally immaterial. Nothing in the apposite rule 
says that buyer's use of the land counts only if he obtained it by 
trespass. 
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The District Court's finding that appellants "enjoyed possession 
and all rights of ownership" of the Anderson Ranch is either an empty 
finding of "rights" never exercised, or simply contrary to the only 
evidence. Except for the lease of a fraction of the property in a 
fraction of one year, which appellants did with the knowledge and 
acquiescence of respondent, appellants never had possession, never 
having set foot on the land, and never exercised ownership. Tr., Vol 
II, pp. 287-782; Vol. IV, p. 521. A lis pendens in effect at all 
pertinent times prevented any exercise of ownership. 
Relief Requested 
The Court has decreed specific performance. Specific performan 
is not available unless plaintiff tenders full performance on his 
side: part of that performance is that the money paid for the land 
was due to be delivered to appellants on the date of deposit. Inter 
est accumulating on the money thereafter belongs to appellants, exec 
to the extent that respondent can show that he has been denied some 
use of the land he would have made. It is essential to recognize tl 
the burden of proof on this point must be respondent's: he must sh 
that the benefits of the bargain he seeks to enforce are not delive 
able because he was denied some use he wished to make, or that acti 
use of the land by appellants prevented respondent's use. He has 
failed. The admitted facts are that respondent behaved as the bene 
ficial owner of the land for years before he attempted to buy it, 1 
it was to preserve such uses that he attempted to buy the land, anc 
that appellant's refusal to accept the tendered funds in no way in 
rupted respondent's continuing use and enjoyment of the property, 
single exception is a short term lease of a part of the property. 
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This lease, however, was entered into with the knowledge and acquies-
cence of respondent: it did not in any manner oust him of any use of 
the property he wished to make. 
It is unnecessary and inappropriate to recompense respondent for 
uses of the land he admittedly was never denied by awarding him inter-
est on money the Court decrees belonged to appellants. It is wrong, 
by refusing them interest on their money, to penalize appellants for 
uses of the property they admittedly never made. 
The only appropriate ruling in this case is that the interest 
which has accumulated on appellants1 money belongs to appellants, 
except insofar as the Court may deduct rentals received for the period 
appellants leased a small part of the land. 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
The Court has apparently misunderstood on whose behalf and about 
whom witness Allen testified, and the nature of the conflict in evi-
dence in this case. As a result, the Court's enforcement of the 
decree of specific performance establishes an unprecedented eviden-
tiary standard, and voids the consideration the Court holds was the 
object of the transaction, in disregard of Utah Supreme Court 
authority. 
Summary of the Evidence 
The Court at page 5 of its Opinion correctly recites that "at 
trial, there was conflicting testimony on the necessity of paying the 
$5000 to Archer and Wolfe". It then summarizes this conflict as 
consisting on one side of Mr. Allen, the attorney who prepared the 
documents, and on the other of Mr. Colman, whom the Court regarded as 
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impeached: "The trial court found Allenfs testimony more credible and 
consistent than Colman's, finding that the $5000 was never intended tc 
be paid." Again, this correctly summarizes what the District Court 
did and what the evidence was in support of the District Court's 
ruling. As a statement of evidence in support of the ruling, however 
it is manifestly inadequate because i/t bears upon the understanding o 
only one side of the transaction. 
Perhaps the Court did not understand that Mr. Allen represented, 
and regarded himself as representing, only Mr. Colman, the original 
seller of the property, and specifically disavowed any attempt to 
understand, or any understanding of the buyers1, Mr. Archerfs and Mr 
Wolfe1s, purposes, intentions, or understandings. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 
94-95. That is, the evidence held to support the District Corut!s 
ruling is the testimony of seller and seller's attorney, limited by 
seller's contrary testimony and the admission of the attorney that 1: 
made no effort to understand and did not understand the buyers' thir 
ing, that seller got the option without having to pay the price re-
cited in the document. 
Against this testimony, and simply ignored by the District Cou 
was the uncontradicted testimony of Archer and Wolfe, fully consist 
with the documents and the surrounding curcumstances, that they alw 
believed the $5000 had to be paid, that they believed the payment v 
essential to realization of their tax purposes, and consistently 
demanded its payment from and after the date the Option became ope 
tive. Tr., Vol. Ill, pp. 449-455; Vol. V, pp. 760-764. 
Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Di 
trict Court's ruling, it shows at most that seller and his attorne 
closing their eyes to what buyers intended or believed, concluded 
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seller could avoid paying the $5000, while buyers, taking the precau-
tion that their views were expresed in the instrument, believed at all 
times that the $5000 had to be paid. That is, there is, at 'best, an 
unresolvable conflict in the evidence to support the District Court's 
ruling. Nothing in the ruling indicates an attempt to resolve this 
conflict. 
Tax Considerations 
Further, while correctly holding that the overall purpose of the 
transactions was to secure certain tax benefits to appellants, the 
Court has eliminated what appellants testified without contradition 
they believed was essential to any tax benefit with regard to the 
land, namely, payment of an independent consideration for the Option. 
Absent payment of independent consideration for the Option, the trans-
action was subject to being construed as "the functional equivalent of 
a loan", as the District Court construed it, with the effect that 
capital gains treatment of proceeds of the sale of the property by 
appellants would be disallowed. All witnesses, including Allen, test-
ified that absent the availability of capital gains treatment, appel-
lants would not have done the deal. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 45, 95-96, 111; 
Vol. Ill, pp. 381-386, 419, 435; Vol. IV, pp. 537-542, 570; Vol. V, 
pp. 731-732, 740-744. 
Applicable Law 
The Court's ruling is incorrect becuase it sets an unprecedented 
standard of proof for disregard of the plain terms of written docu-
ments, and one in direct conflict with the only applicable Utah au-
thorities (Corey v. Roberts, 25 P.2d 940, 942, 947 (Utah, 1933); Clark 
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v. George, 234 P.2d 844 (Utah, 1951); Christensen v. Christensen, 339 
P.2d 101 (Utah, 1959); and see Thomas v. Ogden State Bank, 13 P.2d 636 
(Utah, 1932); Kjar v. Brimley, 27 U.2d 411, P.2d 23 (1972)) and be-
cause it relieves the seller in this transaction of the obligation to 
provide buyers a central consideration all parties agree was due, 
namely, the wherewithal to claim capital gains treatment, in disregarc 
of applicable Utah authority. Paloni v. Beebe, 110 P.2d 563 (Utah, 
1941) . 
The law of Utah is that, where documents on their face absolute 
deeds are sought to be construed, alone or together with other docu-
ments, as indicating in effect a loan against the title, reserving to 
seller for free a right to re-purchase at a price, plaintiff must 
show, by clear and convincing evidence, that both sides of the trans-
action so regarded the documents, Corey v. Roberts, supra; Clark v. 
George, supra; Thomas v. Ogden State Bank, supra. That is precisely 
what has happened in the present case: the District Court has taken 
plain contract of sale and resulting deed, and, construing it with a 
plain option to re-purchase, found "the functional equivalent of a 
loan", reserving to seller without further payment a right to re-
purchase. It has done this on the basis of the testimony of one sid 
of the transaction, without evidence of any kind that the other side 
of the transaction ever regarded the transaction as anything but whc 
appears from the documents. 
The line of cases beginning with Corey v. Roberts provides the 
only applicable analogy for an appropriate evidentiary standard in 
this case. The purpose of the rule of Corey v. Roberts and similar 
cases is plain: the clear terms of written documents may not be 
overthrown based solely upon the self-serving testimony of one side 
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the transaction. The same rule should be applied in the present case. 
The Court's present ruling announces a rule that payments plainly 
required in writing may be excused upon no more evidence than the 
obligor's denial that he believed he should pay. 
The further effect of the Court's construction is that, as a 
result of escaping payment of independant consideration for the op-
tion, seller avoids providing buyers what they bargained for, captial 
gains treatment of proceeds of any sale, in violation of the rule 
announced in Paloni v. Beebe, supra. 
The Paloni rule serves a simlar purpose: self-serving parol will 
not be permitted to reduce the obligations of one side of a trans-
action to the detriment of the other. 
Relief Sought 
The Court should review the evidence of both sides of the 
transaction, to determine whether it meets the evidentiary standard 
established in this State. 
Dated this 29th day of February, 1988. 
I certify that this Petition for 
Rehearing is submitted in good 
faith and not for delay: 
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